The dynamic change in the balance of power in the international arena affects the thawing of outdated interstate and intrastate conflicts in the Intermarium region. At the same time, we are observing several potential hybrid conflicts, which have a peculiar schedule of tension escalation in conflict zones.
In the Balkans, China and the Russian Federation are betting on Serbia. Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Belgrade in early May 2024 resulted in the signing of five dozen cooperation agreements. In particular, China will build a high-speed railway between Belgrade and Budapest, consolidating its influence in Central Europe. After that, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs Milorad Dodik, an ally of the Putin regime, announced to declare independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina before the Serbian holiday of Vidovdan on June 28. If this happens, then an additional tension zone of the Kosovo model may appear in the Balkans, where the issue of the functioning of Serbian municipalities does not regularly escalate. In fact, the Kremlin is very actively playing the Serbian card in order to divert the attention of the European Union from Ukraine and the potential zone of tension in the Baltic states.
The May 15, 2024 assassination attempt on the Prime Minister of Slovakia, R. Fico, raised the question of the possibility of a potential revival of the new ultra-conservative "Austro-Hungarian Empire", given the affinity of the political views of Vučić, Orbán, Fico and the Freedom Party of Austria.
Another Balkan problem is related to the victory in the elections in the Republic of North Macedonia of the nationalist party "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity". The winners are in favor of canceling the new name of the country "Republic of North Macedonia" agreed with Greece, which opened the way for Macedonia's accession to NATO and gave an opportunity to intensify negotiations on accession to the EU. The named party also advocates the denunciation of the agreement on cooperation with Bulgaria. So the Balkans are again becoming a zone of acute conflicts.
The presidential and parliamentary campaign before the October elections in Moldova promises to be tense. Russia is trying to play the card not only of Transnistria, but also of Gagauzia. Ilan Shor is trying to financially support pro-Russian sentiments in Moldova and Gagauzia in order to exclude the scheduled start of official negotiations on Moldova's accession to the EU in December.
Also in October 2024, elections are to be held in Georgia, where tensions are increasing due to the adoption of the law on foreign agents. The ruling Georgian Dream party of the pro-Russian oligarch B. Ivanishvili is counting on the split of the opposition forces, which may prevent them from taking revenge.
The mosaic of conflicts in the Caucasus is complemented by the unresolved problem of demarcation of the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Given Armenia's close relationship with France, Azerbaijan welcomed the riots against the French in New Caledonia, home to 25% of the world's nickel reserves.
The death of Iranian President I. Raisi on May 19 also raises the question of a hypothetical destabilization of the situation in Iran, where early presidential elections are scheduled for June 28. The incident with the helicopter preceded the Raisi talks in Azerbaijan, where Iran showed its unwillingness to accept the intentions of Turkey and Azerbaijan to "break through" the Zangezur corridor from the border with Turkey Nakhichevan to the Caspian Sea, which should give impetus to the development of the "Turan project".
Also, the beginning of the election campaign for the early elections of the House of Commons of the British Parliament, which are scheduled for July 4, 2024, adds to the uncertainty of the situation in the Intermarium region. After all, during the reign of the conservative party in 2016-2024, Britain was a promoter of the consolidation of the states of the Intermarium region. Now at least a hundred days before the formation of the new British government in London will not inspire military-political, diplomatic and other processes in the Intermarium region.
Under these circumstances, the Russian strategy of a hybrid war against the West extends to Central Asia, which Z. Brzezinski still considered the "Eurasian Balkans". It is significant that during Putin's visit to China in Kazakhstan, the Russians kidnapped a deserter from their army, who had been living in Astana since 2023. Social tension in Kyrgyzstan manifested itself in riots caused by Pakistani guest workers. The depth of Uzbekistan's involvement in the division of labor with the Russian military-industrial complex was demonstrated by Putin's visit to Tashkent on May 26-27.
It has a "belt of instability" from the Balkans through the Black Sea-Caspian region to Central Asia. In the Balkans, the Russian Federation is interested in maximum destabilization, even with possible armed escalation, and the Kremlin also wants the situation to develop in Moldova. Instead, in Georgia, the Russian Federation is interested in "freezing" the conflict situation in order to maintain its influence in Tbilisi. Similarly, the Russian Federation is interested in demonstrating its influence on Central Asian countries and preserving the status quo there. Another matter is how much it is possible to manage the chaos, when the interdependent components of the subregion will rather have a domino effect. At least the temporary synchronization of the exacerbation of crisis processes can contribute to the manifestation of a kind of synergistic effect, when one crisis situation fuels and activates typologically related conflicts.