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In Iran, the second round of extraordinary presidential elections took place, in which Masoud Pezeshkian won, whom the media and a number of experts call a liberal and pro-Western politician. Therefore, let's analyze whether we should wait for Tehran to turn towards the West and what will be the general consequences of the reset of the ruling elite in this Islamic republic?
The presidential elections in Iran were extraordinary, as it is known that the previous president of this country, Ebrahim Raisi, died in a plane crash on May 19 this year, along with other high-ranking officials of Iran. Immediately after Raisi's death, discussions began in the expert and media circles on the topic of who can lead Iran and what changes in its foreign policy should be expected in the event of the election of this or that candidate. A number of experts were inclined to think that Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who is known for his anti-Semitic statements and already held this position in 2005-2013, may run for president. However, his candidacy was rejected by the so-called the Guardian Council is a kind of body of political censorship that approves presidential candidates. Also, the ex-speaker of the parliament of this country, Ali Larijani, was not allowed to run for president of Iran.
Thus, six candidates were admitted to the election race, among whom M. Pezeshkian was almost the only liberal-oriented politician and reformist, while his opponents were mostly conservative Islamists. Therefore, his victory, as well as the approval of his candidacy by the Guardian Council, is, if not a sensation, then a certain surprise.
It is noteworthy that in the second round, M. Pezeshkian defeated S. Jalili, a conservative Islamist, an outspoken supporter of deepening cooperation with Russia and China. But on the basis of this, it is premature to draw conclusions that the majority of Iranian society is against the official course of Ayatollah Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), because the turnout in the second round of the elections was about 50%, which is an extremely small indicator, and Pezeshkian himself was ahead Jalili with a slight margin - 53.7%. This percentage of support is normal in stable democracies in Europe and other Western countries, but not in countries like Iran. And the fact that, conditionally, the pro-Western candidate slightly outranked the candidate from the conservative Islamist camp indicates, rather, a split in Iranian society, moreover, on an ethnic basis, because the liberal Pezeshkian won mainly in regions where the non-Persian population lives mainly (Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Lurs, Baluchis).
Quite rightly and justifiably, even before the elections, a number of experts emphasized the fact that the president is not a key figure in the political system of Iran. The main totality of power is concentrated in the spiritual leader of Iran - Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, the president of Iran is the second most influential figure after Khamenei, executive power is concentrated in his hands, and therefore, under certain circumstances - both domestic and foreign, the figure of the new president of Iran can play in favor of improving Tehran's relations with the West - like with Brussels , as well as with Washington.
So, what could be the foreign and domestic political factors that could lead to Iran's reorientation towards the West or, at least, the inhibition of its dialogue with Moscow and Beijing?
If we talk about the internal factor, then we are talking, first of all, about how to find a common language with the Supreme Leader of Iran Khamenei and other high officials, who are conservative Islamists and steadfast in their policy towards Israel, support of Iranian proxies in the Middle East (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.), policies regarding Europe and the USA. Although the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has a solid age (85 years old), he is not going to resign, but even in the event of his resignation or death, obviously, sensationalism about his replacement should not be expected. He will most likely be replaced by a convinced Islamist who will continue Iran's current political course. In addition, the mainstay of the Ayatollah regime is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is an extremely influential military-political force in Iran, and of course also takes conservative Islamist positions and is openly hostile to Israel and the West in general.
However, given the fact that newly elected President Pezeshkian is a reformist who opposes the hijab law, and given the above fact that he was mostly voted for by non-Persian ethnic groups, his inauguration may provide a new impetus for protests against radical Iranian Islamists (the Ayatollah Regime, IRGC), movement for the democratization of Iran. This does not mean that Pezeshkian will lead these protests, it is only about a potential new basis for their renewal, moreover, the main question in this context is - how far can the new president go with democratic initiatives and what will be the reaction of conservative Islamists?
No less interesting is the question of the foreign policy factors of a possible reorientation of Iran towards the West. It should be noted that the most likely condition under which Iran and the West can find points of understanding is the resuscitation of the so-called "nuclear agreement". As you know, in 2018, US President D. Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement. Since then, this agreement has ceased to exist, which, according to many experts, brought Iran closer to Russia and China and exacerbated the situation in the Middle East. Therefore, one could assume that the revival of the nuclear agreement could stimulate Iran to establish a fruitful dialogue with the West, however, contrary to this, two serious obstacles arise at once: the first is, as already mentioned, the leading anti-Western position of Ayatollah Khamenei and other powerful officials and politicians, the second - serious contradictions between Iran on the one hand and Israel with its Western allies on the other regarding the situation in the Middle East (and this, without taking into account the position of the Arab monarchies of this region). We are talking about Iran's active support of the Houthis in Yemen, the Assad regime in Syria, the Hamas and Hezbollah movements. The Houthis, in fact, engage in piracy in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and receive weapons from Iran, including missiles that attack military and civilian ships, Israel is still conducting a special operation in the Gaza Strip against Hamas, which is, in fact, an Iranian proxy and is preparing for an operation in Lebanon against another Iranian proxy - Hezbollah, besides, as is known, on the night of April 13-14 this year, Iran directly attacked Israel for the first time. Thus, we can conclude that the situation in the Middle East is as acute as possible and close to a large-scale conflict, and its solution is possible only through significant concessions from both Israel and Iran (again, not taking into account the factor of other influential players of this region - Arab states and Turkey). Israel is unlikely to compromise with Hamas. His position is unwavering: the special operation against this group in Gaza must be brought to an end, and Hamas must release all the hostages. Also, there is still no reason to say that Israel will abandon the operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, which will further complicate the situation in the region. There is also a separate question regarding Iranian facilities in Syria, which Israel also permanently attacks. Therefore, since the stakes are as high as possible, and the opposing sides have no hint of compromise yet, we can conclude that the Middle East will be a stumbling block in the normalization of relations between Iran, Israel and the West for a long time to come. Although, hypothetically, under a democratic president of Iran, the chance of understanding increases.
So, the main conclusion can be drawn as follows: there is potential for a pro-Western reorientation of Iran, as evidenced by the extraordinary presidential elections. However, today it is futile to hope that Iran will be able to embark on a democratic path of development and reforms. The Ayatollah regime, which professes radical Islamism, makes impossible any real steps towards an understanding with the West and Israel. Therefore, the recipe for the democratization of Iran and, as a result, its possible turn towards the West, lies in internal political processes - only by changing the existing political system and eliminating radical Islamists, Iran can become a secular and democratic state. Under other conditions, similar processes, such as the election of a liberal politician as president, will be only an illusion of democratic changes, and Iran will continue to be an aggressive militarized country in a common camp with Moscow and Beijing.