After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, comprehensive relations and contacts between Kyiv and Ankara began to develop dynamically, which made Turkey one of Ukraine's closest partners, not only in the Black Sea region, but also in the world.

It is important to note that comprehensive relations between the two countries developed and deepened regardless of the political situation in Ukraine and Turkey, which is a marker of reliability and perspective in further cooperation between these countries.

Economy

After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries in 1992, the indicator of mutual trade amounted to about 120 million USD, since 1995 it began to exceed 1 billion dollars and reached in 2008 the figure of 6.583 billion USD. In 2009, the indicator of turnover due to the global financial crisis significantly decreased and amounted to 3.079 billion USD. In 2010, the growth of turnover indicators began again - it amounted to 4.325 billion dollars. That is, in the first 20 years, trade indicators increased more than 36 times.

Before the full-scale invasion of Russia, the turnover between Kyiv and Ankara cut to 7.38 billion dollars and currently, according to forecasts, should exceed 8 billion dollars. However, the development of trade was hindered by Russia's aggression. Also - before the large-scale invasion - on February 3, 2022, an agreement on free trade was signed between Kyiv and Ankara, which had been worked on since 2006.

Before the full-scale war, Turkey accounted for about 5% of Ukrainian exports. Approximately 70% of Ukrainian exports to this country are metals and grains ($1.97 billion and $920 million, respectively, in 2021). A significant increase in the volume of exports to Turkey in 2021 was associated with an increase in the prices of agricultural raw materials and ferrous metals.

Turkey mainly imports into Ukraine textiles ($570 million), engineering products ($450 million), metals ($240 million), oil products (diesel fuel) — $240 million, fruits (citrus, grapes, apricots, cherries ) — 220 million dollars, land transport (mainly buses) — 210 million dollars.

Political dialogue

In addition to economic and trade cooperation, socio-political relations between the two countries also developed actively. As already mentioned, regardless of the political climate in Ukraine and Turkey, the comprehensive dialogue between Kyiv and Ankara has never slowed down over the past 30 years, there have never been any significant disagreements, political or diplomatic scandals or other misunderstandings between the two countries.

As you know, until 2014, Ukraine advocated a multi-vector policy, although the pro-Western or pro-Russian vectors of its foreign policy were sometimes more pronounced, depending on the political forces that were in power. But even this factor did not slow down the development of a comprehensive dialogue between Ukraine and Turkey, which cannot be said about other neighbors of Ukraine. Unfortunately, during more than 30 years of independence, there were moments of deterioration in Kyiv's relations with Warsaw, Budapest, Minsk or Tbilisi. Therefore, the fact that the partnership of Turkey and Ukraine has always been equal is kind of unique and gives real chances for the perspective of the Ukrainian-Turkish dialogue.

After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the start of the war in Donbas, Turkey actively supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The issue of Crimea and Donbas is fundamental for Ankara. It is noteworthy that in the years since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, relations between Turkey and Russia have been both friendly and openly hostile. But even when Ankara and Moscow seemed to find a common language and establish cooperation, the Turkish authorities remained principled and consistent in the issue of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

It should be taken into account that in the Black Sea region, Turkey traditionally singles out the three most important areas of foreign policy: Russia, the EU and the South Caucasus. Also, at the current stage, it is possible to state that Ankara has an objectively higher interest in regional processes in the Middle East (in light of the war in Syria) compared to the Black Sea region. Therefore, the Ukrainian vector was not a priority for Ankara all these years, on the one hand, but on the other hand, if the relations between the two countries cannot be called strategic yet, they can certainly be called partnership and developing.

Of course, the security of the Black Sea region is also important for Turkish foreign policy. However, Ankara is more interested in the stability of its partner countries and neighbors and the preservation of the status quo than, say, in their democratic transitions and the instability that accompanies them. In addition, the problem of Ukraine, with which Turkey does not have a land border, worries Turkish politicians and ordinary Turks less than the war in the southeast of the country and its own security threats: terrorist attacks by the Islamic State, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and the influx of refugees from Syria.

Ankara supports Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. At the same time, the change in the status quo in the region, in particular due to the strengthening of the NATO presence, has always been ambiguously perceived by Ankara. Despite the regular participation of the Turkish Navy in international exercises in the Black Sea, Turkey, for example, vowed to expand the NATO operation «Active Effort» to the Black Sea, did not allow an American warship through the straits during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. 

Russian-Ukrainian war and Turkey

With the beginning of a full-scale war, Turkey, like the entire civilized world, supported Ukraine and its territorial integrity. Ankara's military aid is mostly commercial in nature. That is, Turkey does not provide weapons or equipment as free aid or leasing, and it does not transfer to Ukraine equipment or weapons purchased for us by a third party. However, Turkey has clearly indicated its priority and position in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by selling weapons to Ukraine and, in principle, not selling them to Russia. Although, in this context, it is worth noting that according to the information available in the media, some Turkish companies not only helped Russia circumvent sanctions, but could also sell individual components for its defense industry.

It is also necessary to mention that now in Turkey, in fact, the Ukrainian fleet is being revived. Even before the full-scale war, a contract was signed for the construction of Ada-class corvettes for the needs of the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Moreover, it was about providing Ukraine with technologies for building ships of this class, including their construction in Ukraine. Of course, Russia's aggression makes it impossible to build ships at Ukrainian enterprises, but this process continues directly in Turkey. Thus, in October 2022, the corvette of the Navy of Ukraine «Hetman Ivan Mazepa» was launched. Therefore, Ankara's help in military shipbuilding is not only important, but also key in the matter of reviving the Ukrainian fleet after the war.

Although Turkey is certainly our partner and friend, its generally positive relations with Mokva leave a number of questions and observations. On the one hand, Turkey fulfills all its international obligations – it has closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits for Russian ships, which limits Russia's use of its fleet against Ukraine, supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, condemns Russian aggression on international platforms, etc. On the other hand, Ankara and Moscow cooperate in the trade and economic sphere. Turkey has not joined the Western countries in closing the airspace for Russian aircraft and ignores almost all the sanctions against the Russian Federation imposed by the European Union, Great Britain and the United States. Of course, the West is working to make it impossible to circumvent these sanctions and a number of Turkish companies have already revised their policies regarding contacts with Russia in the direction of ending them, but still Turkey is a considerable hub for Russia in terms of circumventing Western sanctions.

It is important to understand that in the matter of sanctions policy, Turkey is guided by its own interests and, not being a member of the EU, reserves the right to join or not to join the sanctions against the Russian Federation. Today, Ankara considers it necessary to maintain certain relations and contacts with Russia. Their dialogue includes a whole range of issues, and economic cooperation is only the tip of the iceberg here. Turkey aspires to become a regional leader, one of the Asian locomotives, and for this it still needs to maintain a dialogue with Mokva on the issue of the Caucasus, Syria and Iran.

It should also not be forgotten that Turkey is the guarantor of the so-called of the «grain agreement», which allows Ukraine to earn from the export of grain and at least partially keep the Black Sea ports in working condition. Yes, thanks to this, Ukraine earns about 1 billion dollars. month. In addition, the «grain agreement» partially paralyzes the actions of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea.

Prospects for further partnership in the context of the idea of the Baltic-Black Sea Union

Taking into account the positive dynamics in the relations between Ukraine and Turkey, a natural question arises: how to bring them to the strategic level and what awaits these relations after the war?

In the context of this issue, it is worth paying attention to the idea of the Baltic-Black Sea Union (Intermarium), as a model for further cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine, and with other countries of this region, because in the concept of the Mediterranean, Turkey is as important a country as, for example, France for EU or Great Britain for NATO. In addition, if we talk about the Intermarium concept, it leaves much more opportunities for Ukraine and Turkey to deepen the partnership than, for example, for Poland or the Baltic countries, which, being members of the EU, are to some extent dependent on Brussels in their external political and economic affairs. contacts

Also, there is a certain similarity between Turkey and Ukraine in that both countries have the status of candidate for EU membership, but their entry into this union does not yet have a close prospect. Therefore, it can also become a factor in a closer partnership between Kyiv and Ankara, because Turkey, in the conditions of a long-term candidate for joining the EU, managed to build profitable economic contacts with both Europe and Asia, become an energy hub, attract both Western and Chinese investors . This can be a good example for the post-war development of Ukraine, when it will still remain a candidate for joining the EU for some time, but at the same time will deepen economic cooperation in the Baltic-Black Sea region, moreover, it should not be forgotten that Turkey is a key country of the Turkic world and a strategic dialogue with it can strengthen Kyiv's contacts with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and other countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

But friendship between states cannot be abstract and must be based on concrete principles and mutually beneficial points of contact. Such points can be the economy, trade, Turkish investments in post-war Ukraine, including Crimea, Turkey's participation in the privatization of Ukrainian enterprises, the creation of a collective security zone at least in the Black Sea region, the transit potential of Ukraine, Turkey, as well as other countries in the region, etc.

One of the real steps towards deepening economic and political cooperation not only between Turkey and Ukraine, but also in the Baltic-Black Sea region in general, could be the joining of these countries to the Three Seas initiative - an economic and political interstate association, the idea of which is rapidly developing among countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

In any case, comprehensive relations between Ukraine and Turkey have great prospects. Both Kyiv and Ankara are key centers in the Intermarium (Baltic-Black Sea Union) concept, so these countries are simply doomed to become strategic partners.

Valentyn Haidai - director of the Intermarium Institute