Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, not only violated international law but also revealed a profound strategic miscalculation by the Kremlin. Despite expectations of a swift victory, the conflict evolved into the largest military confrontation in Europe since World War II. This article analyzes why Russia finds itself in a strategic deadlock, focusing on ideological, economic, and political factors.

1. Failure of Initial Calculations

Moscow envisioned the so-called “special military operation” as a quick campaign to seize key Ukrainian territories and dismantle its government. However, misjudgments about Ukraine’s resistance, flawed intelligence, and systemic weaknesses within the Russian armed forces turned this effort into a prolonged war. Russia has failed to occupy more than parts of four regions, many of which were later lost.

2. Cost of War and Strategic Consequences

Russia has suffered staggering losses: up to a million casualties, depleted weapons stockpiles, weakened industrial capacity, and growing dependence on military aid from North Korea, Iran, and China. The National Wealth Fund has nearly dried up, capital flight continues, and the country’s middle class is shrinking. Reputationally, Russia has shifted from the promise of “Kyiv in three days” to defending its own territory against Ukrainian strikes. Even a brief review of these consequences underscores the war’s unsustainable cost.

Since 2023, Russia has seen no real strategic gains. Initial territorial advances—mainly in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk—were made when Ukraine had limited capacity to resist. Now, Russia has suffered a largely political defeat: it has failed to secure the Donbas, control other annexed regions, cut Ukraine off from the sea, or destroy its critical infrastructure. Ukraine’s military capacity continues to grow, as does its ability to strike deep into Russian territory.

3. Ideological and Propaganda Constraints

Russia’s failure cannot be fully understood without addressing the ideological and propagandistic dimensions that have shaped its policies over the past 20–25 years. These elements are deeply intertwined, with Russian state ideology channeled through media, education, the Orthodox Church, and cultural narratives.

Following the relatively liberal Yeltsin era, Russian society was gradually saturated with neo-imperialist and chauvinistic ideas rooted in both Soviet and Tsarist traditions. Central to this was the concept of “Moscow as the Third Rome,” the notion of Russian supremacy among Slavic peoples, and the portrayal of Ukrainians and Belarusians as part of a unified “Russian world.”

A key narrative was the glorification of the Soviet victory in World War II. The originally commemorative Victory Day was transformed into a militarized celebration of nationalism. The Russian army was portrayed as the world’s second most powerful force—modern, invincible, and morally superior.

In 2014, amid political turmoil in Ukraine, Russia annexed Crimea and began a hybrid war in the Donbas. These actions were ideologically framed as the defense of ethnic Russians and the reunification of historic lands. The failure to resolve the Donbas conflict diplomatically, combined with overestimating its own strength and underestimating Ukraine’s resilience and Western unity, led Russia to launch a full-scale invasion in 2022.

4. Strategic Collapse of the Myth

The foundational myths underpinning Russia’s aggression—its “invincible” military, status as a geopolitical pole, and entitlement to foreign territories—have collapsed. The war exposed severe structural deficiencies within the Russian armed forces and the illusion of its self-perceived global role.

Ending the war, even through a ceasefire, would amount to an implicit admission that Russia is not a superpower, and that its longstanding propaganda has fabricated an inflated image. Portraying the conflict as a war against NATO cannot obscure the strategic failure: none of Russia’s declared goals have been met.

5. Political and Systemic Constraints

Russia’s domestic situation makes it virtually impossible to end the war without serious internal repercussions. The defense sector constitutes a significant share of the economy, and no viable alternative exists in the foreseeable future. Western companies are not returning, China is not a full replacement, and even domestic capital continues to exit.

Demobilizing Russia’s nearly million-strong army would also pose serious risks. Veterans, accustomed to violence and above-average pay, will return to a civilian world that offers few prospects. Rising crime, especially among ex-combatants, is already observable.

Ethnic tensions are growing in non-Slavic regions like Dagestan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia. Resistance to mobilization and growing autonomy demands are destabilizing. Ending the war could redirect public attention inward, fueling unrest.

Globally, Russia’s influence is waning. Its positions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Syria have weakened, and Central Asian countries are turning increasingly toward Beijing and Ankara. A full defeat would irreparably damage Russia’s role as a regional power.

6. Strategic Deadlock

The main reason Russia cannot stop the war is the systemic failure of its leadership. The initial invasion itself was a strategic error, and no viable exit strategy exists.

• First, Russia cannot secure full control of the annexed Ukrainian territories. Ending the war without them would signal defeat.

• Second, no major power, including China or India, recognizes these territories as Russian.

• Third, any long-term ceasefire risks freezing the conflict and enabling Ukraine to regroup, which Moscow seeks to avoid by demanding a halt to Western arms deliveries.

• Fourth, Russia still behaves as a global power, issuing ultimatums about Ukraine’s “demilitarization” and “denazification” and questioning its government’s legitimacy—rhetoric detached from geopolitical reality.

Therefore, Russia faces a dangerous impasse. Continuing the war depletes its resources, while ending it could trigger internal collapse. For now, Moscow is likely to simulate diplomacy while clinging to the illusion of control. Based on its diminishing capacity, Russia may not be able to sustain major operations beyond mid-to-late 2026.

7. Ukraine’s Position

While Russia’s situation is clearly deteriorating, Ukraine also faces immense challenges. Although Ukraine has a real chance of reclaiming all occupied territories, the path to victory is long and costly.

Ukraine’s advantage lies in its defensive posture and realistic war aims. Kyiv does not seek Russian territory. A return to the February 23, 2022 borders would already constitute a significant strategic win.

Ukraine can pause or freeze the conflict without recognizing any territorial losses. It retains strong international legitimacy and enjoys increasing Western support for reconstruction.

Demobilization, though difficult, will be less destabilizing in Ukraine due to a shared understanding of the war’s just nature, more favorable reintegration conditions, and the absence of deep ethnic or religious divisions.

Finally, as a unitary state, Ukraine is not at risk of fragmentation or civil war—unlike Russia, with its federalized, multiethnic structure.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s postwar recovery will be long and fraught with difficulty: economic strain, demographic losses, and potential political instability are real. However, these challenges differ fundamentally from the existential crisis facing Russia.

This study’s core argument is that the irreversible collapse of Russia’s military, political, and ideological illusions is the primary driver behind its inevitable defeat. Despite all hardships, this creates a real window of opportunity for Ukraine’s eventual strategic victory.